Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Master's Theses

Graduate College

12-2002

Arab American Interest Groups and Congressional
Decisionmaking: A Case Study of the Arab American Institute
Robert L. Harbaugh

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Harbaugh, Robert L., "Arab American Interest Groups and Congressional Decisionmaking: A Case Study of
the Arab American Institute" (2002). Master's Theses. 5024.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/5024

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

ARAB AMERICAN INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE
ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE

by
Robert L. Harbaugh

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 2002

Copyright by
Robert L. Harbaugh
2002

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I want like to begin by thanking the Albion College Department of Political
Science for inspiring and encouraging me to go on and grow in our discipline. Let me
especially thank: Dr. Andrew Grossman, Dr. Myron Levine, and Dr. Glenn Perusek. I
owe Dr. Grossman an extra thank you for being my mentor and also serving on my
graduate thesis committee.
I would also like to thank my all the members of my graduate committee for
guiding me as I wrote this paper: Dr. John Clark, Dr. Susan Hoffman, and Dr. Lawrence
Ziring. Dr. Clark, who also served as my chair, was particularly helpful in making this
project a reality, by helping me to find the focus that was necessary to complete this
paper.
Finally, I owe many thanks to my friends and family. I have to many friends to
mention that deserve thanks, but a special few do stand out, including Kevin Dockerty,
Jon Jordan, Matt and Jennifer Swanson, Jason Watts, and Michael Whipple, for listening
to me, reading drafts, or helping me in any variety of ways as I wrote this paper. Finally, I
owe a special thank you to my family. My mother, Linda, and my siblings Karen and
Roger, who have always encouraged me to accomplish my dreams.

Robert L. Harbaugh

11

ARAB AMERICAN INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESSIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE
ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE
Robert L. Harbaugh, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2002
Unlike other ethnic communities in the U.S., such as the Jewish and Hispanic
communities, the political power of the Arab American community is largely unknown.
Therefore, one manner to gain insight into the political power of Arab Americans is to
study the interest groups that represent their ethnic community. This study uses the Arab
American Institute as the leading Arab American interest group.
The study recognizes that there are three important variables to determining Arab
American influence. The first is voting and is not examined in this study. The second
two, which are examined, are direct lobbying on Congress and political action committee
contributions to candidates for public office. Using interviews with staff of members of
Congress and data from the Federal Elections Commission, the study is able to determine
the level of influence of the Arab American Institute on Congress.
The findings of the study are mixed. The interviews with the Congressional
staffers reveal that even though they have different perceptions of Arab American interest
groups, a common theme emerge that suggests that this community has little influence on
members of Congress. Yet, the results of the PAC contributions yield a different result.
The findings point out that members of Congress, who have received campaign
contributions from a PAC associated with the Arab American Institute, are far more
likely to vote in a manner favorable to the position of the Arab American Institute.
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INTRODUCTION
"Liberty is to faction what air is to fire."
-James Madison, Federalist #10
The American political process is a complex web of institutions that make up the
public policy process. It ranges from the Congress to the executive and to interest groups.
Even the judicial branch plays a role in public policy that only makes the process more
complicated for individuals to navigate. The policy process and the institutions involved
will more often than not make it nearly impossible for an individual person to effectively
influence public policy on the issues that they care about.
The difficulty for an individual to be an effective advocate for their cause forces
them to work together with other individuals in hopes of achieving greater sway in the
public policy debate. This cooperative venture between individuals leads to what we call
an "interest group." A simple, but eloquent definition of an interest group comes from
Jeffrey Berry: "Interest groups are organizations that are not part of the government they
are trying to influence."' Clearly, with this definition we can see the purpose of interest
groups is to influence the government, in effect influence the public policy process. A
group is more likely to be effective at influencing how a member of Congress views a
piece of legislation than an individual will be.
The earlier definition of interest groups allows us to understand the purpose of the
organization and that it is not a government agency. Yet, it does not provide us with an
explicit understanding of the types of interest groups involved in the public policy
process. Interest groups are more varied than the simple idea of people working together
1

Jeffrey M. Berry. The Interest Group Society, 3d ed. New York: Longman, 1997.4-5.
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for a common policy concern. Jeff Berry points out in his book, The Interest Group
Society, that corporations and public interest law firms do not have memberships, but
they do have constituencies that they represent. 2 Therefore, they are representing the
interests of their constituency much like the National Rifle Association (NRA) represents
the interests of its membership. The key point to be understood is that interest groups
represent an interest; whether it be for a membership or a corporation is no different.
The very concept of interest groups has existed in American politics from the very
founding of this nation. James Madison dedicated an entire essay from the Federalist
Papers to a discussion on factions. He used Federalist Paper #10 to wage a lengthy
argument on the dangers, origins, and remedies to what he defined as a faction. Madison
understood a faction as being,
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 3
While this definition is not the one we are using for this paper, it clearly operates along
the lines of the definition provided by Berry. Groups cooperate when they share the same
interest in order to reach a common a goal. Madison saw factions, as he referred to them,
as being a natural outgrowth of liberty. Because we have liberty, we will have factions.
Therefore, to remove factions we would be required to abolish liberty, which Madison
saw as an unacceptable alternative to controlling factions. 4
Madison argued that the greatest cause of factions was property, "But the most

Ibid., 5.
James Madison. The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton Rossiter. New York: Mentor, 1961. 78.
4
Ibid., 78.
2
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common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of
property."5 Arguably, the causes of why interests groups form has grown beyond the
issue of property to include such things as health care and tax code reform. Nevertheless,
factions formed from a common interest, property. Those who had it formed into one
interest group and those who didn't formed into another interest group.
According to Madison, the best way to remedy the problems of factions, which
include distrust between individuals that lead to the downfall of government, is by
creating a republic. 6 An elected government that is representative of the people is the best
measure for controlling the effects of factions. The body of lawmakers will be best
equipped to prevent a tyrannical majority or even a minority from unfairly exerting its
will upon the rest of the country. Combine the national government with that of state and
local governments and all citizens will be both well represented and the lawmakers will
be capable of hearing what the interests of the citizenry include.7
As I have already pointed out, interest groups in America are concerned with
more than just issues of property. Interest groups now include what is known as ethnic
interest groups. The role of these groups is to represent the concerns of their ethnic
membership or ethnic constituency group. They may represent their ethnic group on a
variety of matters before the government, ranging from civil rights legislation to foreign
policy concerns.
The foreign policy concerns of many ethnic interest groups (I will also refer to
them as ethnic lobbies interchangeably) are in direct relation to their ancestral homeland.
James Lindsay points out that many foreign governments use their ethnic lobby
5
6

Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 77-81.
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counterpart in the U.S. to hopefully influence American foreign policy, "Visiting
Armenian, Greek, Israeli, and Mexican officials routinely meet with fellow ethnics to
enlist their support."8 The fact that forei gn officials might try to use these American
ethnic lobbies as tools for their own agenda might be cause for concern to U.S. policy
makers. Yet, Lindsay rejects that concept on the grounds that they provide a much
needed foreign perspective to the forei gn policy debates the government might be
engaged in.9
The Arab American community is a growing ethnic community in the United
States and presents several very interesting questions about their role in influencing
American policy towards the Middle East. Therefore, this paper will seek to be a case
study in understanding ethnic interests groups using the Arab-American Institute (AAI)
as the basis for my research.
In order to provide a clearer picture of the Arab American community, I will
provide some demographic data that can help us to understand this ethnic group. First,
there are approximately 3 million Arab Americans who live throughout the United States.
Of these 3 million, approximately 47% are Lebanese, while only 6% are Palestinian.
Further, overwhelming majorities of Arab Americans are Christian, of which 42% is
Catholic. Only 23% of the Arab American community is Muslim. 10 Not only do these
types of demographic breakdowns make the Arab American community interesting to
study, but their potential political influence also makes them fascinating. 66% of Arab
7

Ibid., 82-83.
James Lindsay. "Getting Uncle Sam's Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America's Foreign Style."
Brookings Review 20, no. 1 (2002): 37-40. Available from http://www.brook.edu; (Accessed April 8,
2002.) 5. Internet.
9
Ibid., 5.
10
Arab American Institute, "Demographics." Available from http://www.aaiusa.org; (Accessed September
3, 2002.) Internet.
8
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Americans live in just 10 states. 33% of their population lives in three politically key
states, California, Michigan, and New York. 11 This could make them politically
important in elections especially if Michigan continues to be a swing state during
presidential elections.
The next step to understand how interest groups operate will be to provide a
review of the existing literature in the field. In the course of this review I will use
scholars such as Jack Walker to provide us with a broad definition of what types of
interest groups exist. The next step will be to use John Tierney to narrow down that
typology of interest groups even further by examining what types of interest groups exist
in the foreign policy community. The review will proceed with broader examinations of
what interest groups do to gain influence, including whether they use an "inside" or an
"outside" strategy, and other important aspects of the interest group literature.
I do not intend for this paper to become a debate as to whether or not ethnic
lobbies are beneficial or not to productive U.S. foreign policy debates. Yet, I do intend to
evaluate how ethnic lobbies achieve their influence and more specifically the role and
success or lack there of, of the Arab American lobby in the United States.

II

Ibid.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Jack Walker provides some historical perspective on the development of interest
groups in American politics in relation to the role and development of political parties in
his essay "The Mobilization of Political Interests in America," from his book Mobilizing
Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and.Social Movements. Walker makes
a significant contribution with this essay on the different types of interest groups that
have evolved over time.
First, there are occupational interest groups that can be divided into profit or
nonprofit groups. Walker points out that these two "subgroups" have historically formed
separate associations from each other and not really combined to form one association
containing both profit and nonprofit members. Further, Walker also points out that
business interests have traditionally been formed to protect against perceived government
interference in their operations. 12
Second, are government-sponsored interest groups. Essentially, the government
acts as the original patron of an interest group in formulating its organization and then
they develop on their own with some help. Walker has multiple examples of interest
groups that were originally government sponsored. He cites the National Rifle
Association (NRA) being formed by the Department of the Army and the American Farm
Bureau Federation being created by the Department of Agriculture. 13 The government is
able to not only form interest groups that it sees as beneficial, but is able to encourage the

12

Jack L. Walker, Jr. "The Mobilization of Political Interests in America," in Mobilizing Interest Groups
in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements, by Jack L. Walker, Jr., 19-40. (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 2000) 28.
13
Ibid., 31.

7
development and growth of many other interest groups by providing tax-free gifts, postal
rate subsidies, grants, and even some government contracts are available to an interest
group promoting their financial well-being. 14
The last type of interest group is the most relevant to the Arab-American Institute
and their endeavors, citizen groups. This is the type of group that is open to all regardless
of their religion, occupation, etc. Citizen groups are interest groups based on a single or
limited number of issues important to them. 15 They have experienced major growth in the
recent past that has been aided by a number of things:
With the growth of a large, well-educated middle class
since World War II, and the development of many new
techniques of carefully targeted mass communication, such
as computerized mailing systems, closed-circuit video
conferences, and toll-free telephone lines, it has become
possible to organize large, highly dispersed formations of
citizens united only by their dedication to a cause or
common beliefs about the appropriate direction of public
policy. 16
This is important to understanding the growth of interest groups because these types of
techniques not only allows for groups to organize, it also makes fundraising more
accessible to the interest group which is important if they want to achieve their desired
goals.
John Tierney provides for an interesting discussion concerning interest groups in
his essay, "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy."
Tierney explores the different types of interest groups that have taken on a role in regards
to foreign and defense policy. He broadly outlines these groups into five categories:
American economic interests, advocacy and cause groups, ethnic groups, foreign
14

15

Ibid., 32-33.
Ibid., 34.
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governments, and finally foreign economic interests. These broad categories of Tierney's
are directly related to the even broader categories of Walker's. For example, Tierney
identifies both domestic and foreign economic interests, which are within the business
category set forth by Walker. These outlines are important because they allow us to
understand the broad scope of the different interests involved in the foreign policy
interest group community. After he outlines the types or groups he proceeds to examine
their effectiveness by using the case studies of trade policy and arms control.
Tierney describes American economic interests as being both U.S. corporations
and labor organizations. American corporations tend to represent their own individual
interests before Congress and work with industry associations when the need arises for an
effort by the entire industry community. Tierney cites the work of what he refers to as
"peak business associations," an example being the Chamber of Commerce, as working
to benefit all business and industries on a variety of matters including foreign trade as one
example. 17
Advocacy and cause groups are also one of Tierney's categories of interest
groups. These groups tend to be associated with "public interest groups." These groups
tend to be made up of citizens and not corporations. Therefore, they work in the desired
interests of their members. 18 Examples of such groups include Green Peace, the Union of
Concerned Scientists, and Amnesty International. The work of these advocacy groups is
varied across the spectrum of international issues as my examples indicate. These groups
are broad in number and purpose.
16

Ibid.
John Tierney. "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy." In Congress
Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, ed. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, 89111. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1993. 91.
17
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A third category is ethnic groups. According to Tierney, the work done by ethnic
lobbies is "on behalf of many different racial, cultural, and religious subgroups in the
American population."19 Tierney points out that the influence of ethnic lobbies depends
on two crucial factors. The first is that the policy they are promoting not conflict with
U.S. security interests. Secondly, the ethnic group must be assimilated enough into
American society to identify themselves as Americans, but not so assimilated as to lose
their ethnic identity.20
The final two categories comprise foreign governments and foreign economic
interests. Tierney discusses both categories under the same heading, but I assert that they
represent two closely connected, but separate, interest groups. Foreign governments have
established a lobbying presence in Washington that goes beyond their traditional
diplomatic efforts. While the use of diplomatic officials is still an active strategy
employed by foreign governments, they have now acquired the services of "highly
regarded Americans to be their lobbyists in Washington."21 Foreign governments have
been providing the lead that their corporations have been following by using Americans
to lobby on their behalf before Congress. Tierney notes that these foreign economic
interests have created a strong lobbying presence in Washington, by creating the
necessary relationships to insure influence and access.22
After Tierney identifies the interests involved in working to shape or influence
Congressional decision-making, the next step for him is to ask how to measure that
influence. Tierney is very clear that determining influence is no easy task and that is very
18
19

20
21

Ibid., 92.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid.
Ibid.

10

problematic for a researcher. Instead of asking how much influence an interest group has,
Tierney asks," .. . what difference its efforts made."23 In effect this question Tierney uses
to assess influence is meant to find out if an interest group's influence can make a defeat
less damaging to their goals or if they can achieve a complete victory on legislation that
is important to them for either passage or defeat. Therefore, Tierney alters how to assess
the effectiveness of these interest groups by examining a variety of different factors.
The factors that Tierney now explores are the means to answer his question
concerning influence. He makes clear that these interest groups have different levels of
consideration based upon the situation. Interest groups have little influence during times
of crises. They also have less influence on those issues that have attracted significant
public interest and led to deep divisions with the public and/or political ideologies. Thus,
interest groups are most likely to impact those issues that are not in the public view and
do not cause significant political rifts. Also, they are more likely to have an effect when
they resist change to existing policies rather than to try to enact change.24
Foreign and defense policy interest groups do share some things in common with
domestic policy groups, their need to effectively marshal their resources together and
apply them with equal effectiveness. According to Tierney,
Especially important are the possession of substantive
information and defensible policy rationales but also
crucial are resources such as money, an appealing cause, a
skillful staff, an attentive membership widely dispersed
across many congressional districts, and strategically
placed allies among policymakers in govemment.25

22
23
24
25

Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 98. Emphasis is from the original author.
Ibid., 98-99.
Ibid., 99.
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With these types of resources in place and being used effectively, an interest group has an
opportunity to impact policy decisions. The list Tierney provides is by no means an end
all list of what makes an interest group effective, but it is the foundation of an effective
interest group and without these resources an interest group will not fare well in
impacting policies.
With an understanding of the make-up of interest groups and how to measure
influence, Tierney provides two alternative case studies in which to test his theory, trade
and national security. Tierney briefly reminds us that trade has historically been an issue
that the Congress addressed, but that role shifted to the executive in 1934, with the
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. This law allowed Congress to shift the
blame to the executive when economic policies went awry, leaving them in the politically
desirable position of not being at fault. Congress generally shied away from trade policy
until the mid-1980's when ballooning trade deficits caught their attention along with
other changes developing on the international economic scene. 26
Thus, with a growing involvement on the part of Congress in trade policy,
economic groups were again prone to try to use their influence to affect the decisions of
Congress. Tierney points to the work of Pietro Nivola in explaining how Congress affects
trade policy. Nivola points out that Congress does not tend to make broad sweeping legal
changes, but instead makes incremental changes to existing law. 27 Interest groups are able
to achieve these "victories" on trade policies by using a variety of tactics to achieve their

26

Ibid., 100-101.
Ibid., 102. From Pietro S. Nivola, "Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field." In A Question of
Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas E. Mann. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution. 1990.
27
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goal, but the most effective tactic is" ...substantive information and defensible policy
rationales, which are the real political currencies on the Hill."28
Tierney next turns to a case study of national security policy, specifically arms
control and defense spending decisions by Congress. Tierney specifically examines the
role of the nuclear freeze activists of the 1980's and their impact on Congress. He claims
that they made use of every political tool available to them. These included PAC
contributions, massive grassroots campaigning, and gaining media attention. 29 They were
able to gain influence by using these tools and making a difference in Congressional
elections in 1982. This all lead to a passage of a nuclear freeze resolution in the U.S.
House, but failed to win in the Senate. The nuclear freeze movement fell apart as a viable
political power by 1985.30
He also briefly examines the case study of defense spending in regards to interest
group involvement. He points out that Congress has undergone dramatic changes in
regards to how it sets the budget for defense spending. This includes budget reform
processes in the mid-1970's to the drastic scale back of defense spending dollars in the
1990's. Defense interests have used lobbyists and spending millions in campaign
contributions to achieve their desired results for their defense companies. Defense
contractors are not the only interests involved in regards to military weapons, as public
interests groups have also taken an active role in weapons debates.31
Tierney concludes his study with some important observations for how things
have changed with how Congress makes its decisions. First, interest groups not only

28
29
30
31

Ibid., 103.
Ibid., 105.
Ibid.
Ibid., 106-107.
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affect outcomes, but are also "affected by the larger institutional and political settings. "32
Secondly, because of the reforms Congress has made that make it more decentralized, it
has created numerous ways for interest groups to be able to influence its decision
making. Essentially, no one person or committee chair has absolute authority anymore.
This is also important because the increased number of foreign and defense policy
interest groups is a response to the increased role of Congress in making decisions on
these matters. 33 Tierney points out that this is likely to make interests groups more
aggressive and make for more polarized politics. 34 Tierney's work is important because it
recognizes that fundamental changes have occurred with how Congress addresses foreign
and defense policy. Those fundamental changes have created a vast network of interest
groups that seek to have their voices heard and influence felt on Capitol Hill. Further,
changes will also be occurring in the future, we may not know exactly what those
changes are, but we can expect them.
Tony Smith did one of the best studies of ethnic interest group participation in the
United States in his book Foreign Attachments, where he examines ethnic interest groups
and their role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. In his book, Smith presents three major
proposals. The first is that ethnic interest groups are more involved in the political
process than widely perceived. Secondly, their activities may have more negative effects
than positive ones. Finally, there are complex problems caused by a pluralist democracy.
Those complex problems raise the simpler question, how to balance the rights and

32
33
34

Ibid., 108.
Ibid., 109.
Ibid., 110.
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interests of the few against the many. 35 Smith very smoothly sums up the results of his
proposals:
These three findings dovetail nicely: because ethnic group
influence is underappreciated and because it sometimes
complicates the exercise of American power in the world
(issues of practical importance), complex and important
questions concerning the character of this country's
pluralist democracy and the rights and obligations of
citizenship (issues of political ethics) can be raised.36
It should be obvious that Smith sees the actions of an ethnic interest group can create
complicating problems for American policy and foreign policy especially.
Smith argues that we have gone through two separate stages of ethnic group
influence and are now entering a third stage of influence. The first stage is from around
1900 until about the beginning of the Second World War. During this time, "the most
active ethnic groups - German, Scandinavian, and Irish, and later Italian - acted as a
drag on American involvement in world affairs."37 One of the key reasons for the ability
of these groups to be "a drag" on American policy was because of their large numbers of
immigrants entering the United States. Smith points out that in 1910 the U.S. population,
which totaled 92 million, contained at least 13.5 million who were foreign born which
represents almost 15% of the total population. Further, of the 13.5 million foreign born
people living in the United States, approximately 12 million were from the belligerent
nation-states involved in World War I. 38 Clearly, if 15% of the population is actively
opposed to national policies, such as involvement on the European continent, then they

Tony Smith. Foreign Attachments: The Power ofEthnic Groups in the Making ofAmerican Foreign
Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2000. 1-2.
36
Ibid., 2.
37
Ibid., 47.
38
Ibid., 51.
35
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will get some attention and could force changes in planned foreign policy. This could be
considered to have led to bad American foreign policy.
The second stage identified by Smith is from 1945 to the end of the Cold War.
During this period of time ethnic group influence rapidly changed its view.
"Internationalism, not neutrality or isolationism, became the hallmark of this new stage of
ethnic activism, providing a firm domestic underpinning to U.S. steadfastness in fighting
Soviet communism."39 This remarkable change in policy led to a completely new role for
European ethnic groups in influencing American foreign policy. Smith goes on to
describe how descendants of East and West Europe helped the U.S. win the Cold War:
From Washington's perspective, the Cold War in Europe
allowed East and West European Americans to feel a
solidarity with one another as well as an end to any tension
they might have felt between their ethnic loyalties and their
identities as Americans - the problem that had bothered
Washington between the 1910's and 1941 ...Indeed, activist
elements among East European and Jewish Americans
were influential in their different ways at upsetting effort at
detente and so forcing the Cold War to a conclusion
ultimately favorable to the United States. 40
This statement by Smith reflects the power that ethnic interest groups can use in order to
achieve their desired outcomes of American foreign policy.
Smith also describes an emerging ethnic interest group being African Americans
who began to take an active interest and politically influential role in shaping American
foreign policy toward Africa during this second stage as well. He argues that African
Americans worked within the American political system to achieve their goals. With the
election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States, their influence increased

39
40

Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 59.
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· dramatically and helped to later lead to economic sanctions against South African
apartheid.41
With the end of the Cold War we have entered the third stage of ethnic group
influence, according to Smith. This stage is still marked by activist support for American
engagement in world affairs. Smith argues that the end of the Cold War has led to two
new developments in the power of ethnic interest groups,
The end of the Cold War has given rise to two interrelated
developments so far as the influence of American ethnic
groups in Washington are concerned: the rise of
ethnonationalist conflict abroad stemming from the
collapse of Soviet power and the withdrawal of American
support has alerted American kinfolk to the need for action;
and the decline of any obvious threat to U.S. security has
weakened the American state relative to social forces at
home, which in tum has increased the openness of our
political system to interest group influence. 42
One of the examples that Smith uses to prove his point about increased influence is the
enlargement of NATO. He describes the active involvement of Eastern and Central
European Americans in the 1996 Presidential elections and that they represented
significant voting blocs in several key states, which included Michigan and Ohio. Smith
points out that President Clinton gave all his major NATO enlargement speeches in key
cities such as Detroit and Chicago. 43
Smith also discusses the fact that other new ethnic groups are beginning to make
an impact on American foreign policy such as the Latin American organizations. Even
with this explosion of ethnic interest group influence in this third stage, Smith points to
the problems that such influence can create for the making of American foreign policy.

41
42
43

Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 65.
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The Helms-Burton sanctions act, meant to help secure the end of Fidel Castro's regime in
Cuba, was legislation heavily promoted by the Cuban ethnic interest group community.
Their efforts, which helped to secure passage of this law in 1996 and thereby created an
explicit aspect of U.S. foreign policy, has led to some negative consequences for the U.S.
in the international arena. One example of where it has created a problem for U.S. foreign
policy, cited by Smith, is the United Nations General Assembly resolution, which passed
by a vote of 143 to 3, calling on the United States to end the Helms-Burton sanctions
against Cuba.44 Such dramatic actions by the international community undoubtedly have
a negative effect on American credibility in the conduct of international relations.
The importance in this history of Smith's is that it shows us that ethnic interest
groups are not new players to the political scene, quite the opposite in fact. It also tells us
that their influence has changed with changes in time, which is directly related to the
three stages. While it is important to note that AAI is not that old among interest groups,
it is part of a community of ethnic interest groups that have existed for a long time
already and that they are merely a new ethnic community to the political scene.
Jack Walker also provides a starting point for understanding why interests
mobilize in his essay, "Explaining the Mobilization of Interests," which is found in
Walker's book Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social
Movements. He begins his examination of mobilization with a brief look at previous
views on how and why groups mobilize. This review includes works by Mancur Olson,
Robert Dahl, and David Truman. While Walker recognizes the importance of these
earlier contributions, he believes that previous research fails to provide the better
understanding of how and why interests groups form.

18

Walker suggests that the reason interest groups do form is that"patrons"
for these interest groups have grown large in number. These patrons are for the most part,
according to Walker," .. .large, complex institutions, not wealthy individuals."45
Nevertheless, individuals are involved. The author presents us with a list of potential
patrons and their impact on mobilizing interests groups, some of which might surprise
some individuals:
Government officials, the leaders of major foundations, the
largest businesses, and many other important institutions in
American society are powerful forces in encouraging or
discouraging the development of new groups in response to
major social developments. Patrons of political action, from
both the private and public sectors of the economy, alter the
public opportunities for mobilization and for representation
through the interest group system.46
The reason that I say the list might be surprising to some is because of the role of the
government in being a potential patron for interest groups. Further, by no means do I
believe that this list is a"be all and end all" list of potential patrons to interest groups, but
it does provide for a framework for understanding who possible patrons might include.
Walker distinguishes between"institutional patronage and political mobilization,"
and"social movements and political mobilization." The key to understanding the
difference between the two is almost as if organizations, or to be more specific business,
was what consisted among institutional patronage. Business does not have to mean
General Motors; it can mean a society of professionals working together for common
policy objectives.47 On the other hand, social movements tend to be more like"political
44
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insurgencies" that involve activities like political protest and possibly even the use of
boycotts. 48 Admittedly, the two types of groups discussed by Walker are very different
from each other, but that does not mean that they cannot be working together. The author
cites the civil rights work of the 1960's as the beginning of not only increasing interest
groups, but also a period in time in which complex institutions worked with the groups
organizing social movements. 49
The purpose of this piece is to explain why people mobilize. We learn that it is, as
we might suspect, to protect and/or promote one's interests. The difference is in
understanding how they mobilize and what we discover is the importance of patrons in
making mobilization a reality. While it is easy to link patrons as being available only to
the wealthiest individuals or corporations who seek to merely protect their own interests,
we discover that a surprisingly large number of potential patrons exist, not only for
business, but to aid social movements as well.
While Walker's view of patrons is important, it is not the only viable theory
concerning how interest groups form. In his article, "An Exchange Theory of Interest
Groups," Robert Salisbury examines how political entrepreneurs are crucial in forming an
interest group. This essay by Salisbury is actually about more than just political
entrepreneurs, but that is the aspect I shall focus on, as it is most relevant to discussing
AAI.
Salisbury begins his essay with an examination of two previous theories of
interest group formation, the first is proliferation hypothesis and the second is the
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homeostatic mechanism hypothesis. He argues, while using the growth of agricultural
interest groups as the case study, that both of these theories are not effective in providing
an explanation of interest group formation.50 Therefore, he sets out to lay the groundwork
for a new theory of interest group formation, what he calls an exchange theory.
Salisbury readily admits that his exchange theory is based on "simple economic
models."51 He cites four core terms, which must exist f�r his theory to function. They are:
entrepreneur/organizer, benefits, group member, and exchange.52 Of these four terms the
most important to our discussion is the entrepreneur/organizer, which we shall also refer
to as political entrepreneur. According to Salisbury the definition of a political
entrepreneur shall be, "The entrepreneur in any organizational situation is the initiator of
the enterprise. Behaviorally, it is always true that he must make the first move if any
exchange activity is to occur."53 The exchange activity that he is referring to is the idea
that the political entrepreneur has provided goods and/or services in exchange for people
becoming members. Those goods and/or services are what he refers to as benefits. The
reasons that an individual may become a political entrepreneur are varied. They might do
it as a simple career choice or because they believe passionately in their cause and
therefore their cause is why they do it. Other reasons could include the opportunity to
influence the political process and become a person who wields significant power in the
public policy community.
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Salisbury points to three different types of benefits a person might receive from
being a member of an interest group. He uses the work of Peter Clark and James Q.
Wilson to list and describe the three types of benefits: material, solidary, and purposive
benefits.54 The first of these benefits are referred to as material benefits, which means
they are tangible benefits. The person who receives material benefits could be receiving a
job or money or some other form of goods or services. 55
The second type of benefit is a solidary benefit. This type of benefit only an
individual can receive because it is"...experienced directly and within the self."56 It is
the benefit of having oneself associated with a particular group of individuals. Salisbury
is careful though to regard such types of groups that provide such solidary benefits as
"fringe" groups that are unlikely to be of any relevance in influencing public policy.57
The final type of benefit is the purposive benefit. This type of benefit can be
defined as,
the realization of suprapersonal goals, goals of the
organization or group. Although, of course, the benefits of
such achievement may accrue to particular individuals they
are not ordinarily divisible into units of value allocated to
specific persons or charged against unit costs. Nor can
purposive benefits always be confined to the parties
seeking them.58
Purposive benefits are the most applicable that members of AAI can receive. One only
needs to look at the mission of AAI to realize that it provides purposive benefits
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compared to material or solidary benefits. The mission of AAI is quite simple; it seeks to
represent the Arab American community's interests in government and politics. 59 These
types of benefits can only be purposive because having your interests represented fails to
provide one with direct tangible benefits or gaining social status by being a member of
the organization.
Philip Jones has also looked at the subject of political entrepreneurs and their
relationship to interest groups. By looking at Jones' definition of a political entrepreneur
we find several characteristics of such an individual. First, a political entrepreneur
recognizes a group of individuals who share a common goal and will use this to profit
themselves in some manner. This also assumes that the political entrepreneur will seek to
maximize their profit. 60 Jones does not make clear exactly what forms of profit he is
talking about. Therefore, I believe it can be a safe assumption that profit can mean a
variety of different things for any political entrepreneur. It can represent financial profit
or even some sort of personal profit because they feel a great deal of personal passion for
their cause and are not seeking to reap a financial profit from this venture. A final
characteristic is that of a "go-between." This is where the political entrepreneur
establishes himself or herself as the person who provides the goods desired by the
membership in exchange for their support. 61
Another important aspect of understanding interest groups is in understanding
how they employ that influence to affect public policy. Thomas Gais and Jack Walker
explore how interest groups exercise their influence in their essay, "Pathways to
59
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Influence in American Politics," from Walker's book Mobilizing Interest Groups in
America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements. This chapter specifically
examines the choice between "inside" and "outside" strategies made by interest groups
and which strategy is more likely to be implemented by each type of group.
An "inside" strategy can be defined as activities "to convince public officials to
take some form of action or to modify an established policy by means of close
consultation with political and administrative leaders." This form of activity can use
financial resources and substantive expertise on the policy in order to achieve the interest
group's desired results. 62 While an inside strategy may operate on the basis of direct
lobbying, the opposite is true for an "outside" strategy. An outside strategy is "an indirect
effort to exert influence upon the outcome of a specific policy decision."63 Further, an
outside strategy may be a supplemental effort to the efforts of an inside strategy, in which
the interest group uses its membership as a political tool. 64 Some examples of what
constitutes an outside strategy could include getting the interest group's membership to
make contacts with their Member of Congress, protests, and demonstrations.
Multiple factors must be weighed before an interest group decides which of the
two strategies will be the foundation for all future endeavors. The authors find that the
most critical factor to influence their decision will be defined by the amount of conflict
that exists within their area of concern. Following the level of conflict, other variables
involved include organizational resources, its membership, and financial support.65
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Gais and Walker operationalize organizational resources as the size of the staff
that an interest group has available to it. The size of the staff dictates what political
tactics are available to it. A small staff is restricted to taking on fewer activities because it
does not have the capacity to effectively execute its strategy if it attempts to overreach its
staffs resources. On the other hand, a large staff can allow an interest group to increase
their capacity for multiple tasks or multiple strategies in order to gain or wield
influence. 66
The next determining factor is the "character of a group's membership." The
membership of any interest group is what really decides what the goals of the group will
be. Since the membership decides the goals of any group it is the responsibility of the
group's administration to accomplish those goals:
The survival of the organization is assured only so long as
it is able to maintain the approval of its members, so its
leaders normally must direct all efforts to advancing those
values and policies that are of direct concern to the
membership. 67
The character of a membership must always be taken into consideration when examining
an organization or even when leading one. Without an understanding of its character the
leadership will fail to properly understand the goals of the membership and thereby most
likely fail to achieve their desired aims.
One other major factor in determining what political strategy to pursue is
concerned with financial resources. Gais and Walker are not referring to budgets when
they discuss the financial resources; no doubt that budgets help to determine strategy, but
they examine it from the perspective of who gives the group their monetary support:
66
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Most groups rely upon several different sources of funding
and are not entirely beholden to any single patron, but
group leaders cannot ignore the political goals or
preferences of their patrons anr more than the needs of
their dues-paying members. 6
Clearly, this points out that while the character of a group's membership may be
important in determining goals, it is by no means exclusive in its influence on the
administration of an interest group. The administration ·of any group needs its patrons'
continual support in order to fund its activities; in a sense the administration has two
separate "bosses" to keep happy. It must maintain the support of both its membership and
its patrons at the same time, even if that might mean conflict between the two sources of
support.
Gais and Walker readily point out that by examining the given factors on what
influences a group's political strategy, we discover that the different types of groups that
Walker discussed in an earlier piece, take different strategies. For example, profit
occupational interest groups tend to prefer inside strategies because they only take on
issues of primary concern to them which decreases potential conflict, they tend to rely
more on their membership dues rather than patrons, and finally they tend to have larger
organizational resources. All of these factors suggest that this type of group prefers an
inside strategy. 69
While an examination of the strategies chosen by the different typologies of the
interest groups could be useful, it is more important to examine the specifics of citizen
groups as we have already narrowed AAI into that category of interest groups. Based
upon the variables discussed earlier and the inclusion of what Gais and Walker refer to as
68
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subunits (a dummy variable), but are effectively local or regional chapters of an interest
group, they develop a model to run a multivariate analysis to determine if these factors do
indeed influence the choice an interest group makes on which political strategy it will
adopt.
The results for citizen groups are relatively clear: they tend to use outside
strategies as a dominant form of political strategy. Using the authors' regression of
outside strategies, they discover that conflict and subunits are very important factors used
by citizen groups to decide that the outside strategy is their preferred method. 70 On the
other hand, when inside strategy is regressed, we find that citizen groups again use
conflict as important factor, but also staff size in determining whether or not to use an
inside strategy. Gais and Walker best summarize their findings as follows:
To summarize, the groups most likely to adopt inside
strategies are those in the profit sector that maintain large
staffs and perceive high levels of conflict in their
environment, while the groups least likely to follow the
inside pathway to influence are those citizen groups with
few organizational resources that experience little or no
conflict with other groups and do not feel that they are
affected by the outcome of national elections. 71
Based on the evidence that we see from Gais and Walker we can assume that most citizen
groups will likely adopt an outside strategy in order to achieve their desired political
goals.
Tony Smith, who provided us with a history of ethnic interest groups earlier, also
examines how ethnic interest groups exercise influence in Washington, DC. In order to
understand how that influence is achieved, Smith looks at two important topics, the
Ibid., 105-107, 118. Some of this evidence is based upon a regression analysis used by Gais and Walker
concerning inside strategies. See Table 6-6 on page 118.
70
Ibid., 117. See Table 6-5.

69

27

structure of American politics and how the ethnic groups are organized. Smith views
state-society relations as being an integral if not the most integral aspect of how
American politics is structured. 72 Essentially, Smith is arguing that with the current
structure of American democracy, the political process and institutions, such as the
Congress, are easily accessible to an interest group. This accessibility has allowed interest
groups, more specifically ethnic interest groups, an opportunity to help shape policy,
especially foreign policy. 73
According to Smith, the result of his review of the American political structure
lends itself to four basic propositions. The first is that ethnic interest groups need to be
studied separately from other forms of interest groups. Secondly, because of the nature of
the American political system, it requires very little political capital to start an interest
group, including ethnic interest groups. Third, even though some ethnic groups are
political party affiliated, there are still some conditions in which ethnic group influence is
likely to be greater. 74 Finally, interest groups at times may wield enough influence to
actually determine national policy, but whether or not it may represent the best for the
nation is in question. 75 With an understanding of how Smith views the American political
structure we can now proceed to his discussion on how ethnic interest groups exercise
their influence.
Smith finds that there are three basic methods used by ethnic interest groups to
wield influence over public officials. These are: the ethnic community's vote, campaign
71
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finance contributions, and by an organizational body, which is in reference to the
structure of the interest group itself.76 Smith suggests that just because ethnic
communities may lack size in terms of pure numbers, that doesn't mean that they aren't
hugely important in the electoral process. He cites that the Jewish, Greek, Cuban, and
Armenian communities as comprising very small percentages of the total population, yet
they are politically powerful as ethnic groups. 77
While ethnic groups are small in population percentage and may have some effect
on national elections, Smith points out that their real influence can be found in
Congressional elections:
Ethnic voters do not have to make a decisive difference in
national elections for their voice to be heard in Washington.
It may be enough for ethnic lobbies to achieve their goals
to be represented by well-placed members of Congress,
preferably by senior senators or representatives in charge of
committees whose duties give them a role in determining
matters of significance to the ethnic community. 78
One example that he uses to cite the importance of an ethnic group voting in such
elections is the Jewish community of New York. Smith points out that they constitute a
significant portion of the state's Democratic party and tend to vote in above average
numbers helping to ensure that their voice is heard in foreign policy before Congressional
committees. As he points out, the manner in which we elect people to Congress creates
an opportunity for ethnic interest groups to apply pressure to the candidates because their
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support could be crucial in deciding some elections, thereby giving influence to the
group.79
Campaign financing is the second method that Smith cites concerning how ethnic
interest groups gain influence. He readily admits that ethnic interest groups give large
amounts of money to candidates for public office and for some very small ethnic
communities this a method to make up for their lack or"voting power. 80 Yet, there is a
possible problem with the ethnic interest group money, which is that it might be illegally
raised. 81 He cites several examples of illegal campaign contributions, including the large
donations made by the Asian American community to the Democratic party for the 1996
presidential election. 82
In his review of campaign financing, Smith declares it almost impossible to track
ethnic contributions. "In my investigations into ethnic group financing of various
campai gns, I found it was often impossible to establish who contributed what or why."83
Yet, we know ethnic interest groups do give money and lots of it to gain access. One
example of this is the amount of money donated by the Jewish community. Smith points
out that they might very well donate half or more of all Democratic party funds for
national elections.84 This large number of donors might seem high, but when put in the
context of Jewish PAC's such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee),
Jewish-owned companies, and Jewish individuals all making donations, it seems to be a
much more reasonable number.
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Further, while not all Jewish donors might have the same political agenda as
AIPAC, it is very easy for AIPAC to take advantage of these other individual donations
to gain further leverage. This is because if the individuals don't make their political views
well known, the candidates who received that money are not going to know the
difference and can easily associate those donations with those given by Jewish PAC's.
This could very well be one of the reasons that the Arab American community does not
share the same level of influence as the Jewish American community, they simply are not
providing the same levels of campaign contributions as is the Jewish community. I will
explore this further later in my study.
The final aspect of acquiring and exercising influence according to Smith is what
he calls organizational leadership. This can be broken down further into three separate
categories: organizational unity, coalition building and agenda setting, and monitoring
policy. All of these aspects must be employed by an ethnic interest group to achieve
success. Smith uses the AIPAC as the model for all successful ethnic interest groups. 85
Organizational unity involves the interest group being united in its efforts, at least
in public, in order to show strength and prevent the appearance of weakness within the
organization. This can be done at first by its organization being formed with a strong
leader who makes the organization into a force in politics. This could be the role of a
patron from Gais and Walker or a political entrepreneur from Salisbury. Nevertheless,
while the first leader of the organization may be important, Smith argues that they are
potentially dangerous later if the interest group does not become more
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"institutionalized."86 Therefore, it is important to have a strongly rooted base so that the
organizational unity may be maintained.
Next for Smith is coalition building and agenda setting. This activity involves the
interest group seeking allies outside of their own ethnic community. "A political agenda
must be established, allies sought, and actual political pressure brought to bear - all
matters that involve action outside the ethnic community itself."87 There are three
common types of demands sought out by ethnic interest groups: 1) human rights, 2)
economic demands, such as foreign aid, and 3) security demands. 88 In order to gain any
effectiveness in pressing their demands the ethnic group must go outside their
community. Using AIPAC as an example, they work closely with conservative Christian
groups to access political leverage. 89 Smith points out that a common ally for Arab
Americans is the African American community. 90 The goal of working with other interest
groups outside your ethnic community is to increase the political pressures brought to
bear on a public policy and hopefully thereby increasing your influence.
The third and final category is that of monitoring policy. This is related to "inside
lobbying." It is using lobbyists to meet with members of Congress and/or their staffers in
order to make your influence more directly felt. Smith admits that the most powerful
figure in foreign policy decision-making is the president, but Congress is far more
accessible to lobbyists:
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Hence, while not for a moment forgetting the paramount
importance of the White House, ethnic lobbies invariably
focus most of their energy on the Congress, especially on
the House, while their members at the grassroots anxiously
await primaries. 91
Clearly, successfully getting your voice heard as an ethnic interest group is to place your
efforts into establishing connections with members of Congress, because establishing a
network at the White House is so much more difficult to accomplish and could end up
wasting precious resources if you fail.
Thus, I assert that while both the other categories of organizational resources are
important, this is by far the most critical to an effective ethnic lobbying effort. This is the
type of effort where members of Congress and their staffers know who your lobbyists are
and can even seek them out. The ability to monitor policy and to know who your friends
and enemies are in Congress is to have the ability to shape public policy because you
know what strategies to employ and where to place your resources in order to be most
effective. 92
Smith's book provides us with an excellent history of ethnic interest groups. It has
helped me to realize that these are not something new to American politics, but in fact are
rather old to the political scene generally speaking. Further, it has given us another
manner to examine how influence in gained in Washington, DC. We can find some
common ground between Smith's work and Gais and Walker's examination of influence.
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Especially with reference to inside strategies, Smith expounded on the concepts presented
by Gais and Walker, by making them more understandable for foreign and defense policy
interest groups. I can now use the ideas presented by both Smith and Gais and Walker to
create my own model for examining how the Arab American community asserts
influence through AAI.

groups. I also would not dismiss the importance of an outside strategy, but rather suggest that the most
effective outside strategy has an effective inside strategy working parallel to it.
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RESEARCH QUESTION
In order to understand the direction that this study is taking we must ask ourselves
some questions that can give us the necessary guidance to pursue this topic. Does the
Arab American community have influence over Congressional policymaking? That is the
central question that is being asked. Yet, to answer that question, direction is still
necessary.
Therefore, to explore the central question, I will establish a model with which to
answer it. I have chosen to use AAI as the case study for examining Arab American
influence because they are touted as a leader among the Arab American community. As
seen in Figure 1 (see Appendix A), three key variables must be established in order to
answer the central question. All of the factors are independent variables. The dependent
variable is influence. The first independent variable is voting turnout among the Arab
American community. Secondly, are organizational resources. In essence this is an
examination of an insider strategy by AAI. The final variable examines political action
committee (PAC) contributions to members of Congress. I will use two separate roll call
votes from the House of Representatives to determine if PAC contributions make a
difference in terms of establishing influence.
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CASE STUDY OF AAI
With the model in place, which consists ofthe Arab American community's
voting turnout, organizational resources, and PAC contributions, it becomes easier to
examine their level ofinfluence in Congressional decision-making. Unfortunately, while
this model does contain three distinct variables I will only be measuring two ofthem.
The voting turnout variable will not be measured in this study because it is beyond the
scope ofthis project. I by no means want to devalue the importance ofthis variable and
encourage future scholars to examine this aspect ofthe model in greater detail in the
future.
Reasons that voting is important to this model are varied and should be
considered by future scholars ofthis topic.93 Ifthe study was to include voting and focus
on district-by-district races ofthe House, one could see where the strongest voting centers
ofthe Arab American community are located. By cross referencing those districts against
U.S. Census data it would be possible to determine ifthe community is voting as a bloc
or not. This could translate into determining ifthey are influencing House races and how
the candidates and especially the eventual winner relate to the Arab American
community. Further, they could examine those representatives' roll call voting records to
determine ifthey are influenced by possible election rewards or consequences by their
district voters.
One other excellent reason to include voting in future models is to determine if
political party affiliation is having an influence on Congress. Ifthe Arab American
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community is equally divided in political affiliation between Republican and Democratic,
this division could have a negative impact because it does not present the appearance of a
united ethnic community. The agendas of the political parties differ on how to handle the
issues of importance to the community and therefore should be taken into account with
future models. 94
Before examining the model any further, let us begin with a discussion of how
AAI fits into being an interest group based upon the literature that has been previously
examined. There are several different Arab American interest groups that could be
studied and undoubtly deserve the time and attention of scholars. One example of a very
important group is the National Association of Arab Americans-American Arab Anti
Discrimination Committee (NAAA-ADC). This group is the product of a merger between
the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), a foreign policy group, and the
American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), a civil rights organization. The
NAAA-ADC is now the government affairs arm of the ADC. 95 Clearly, this has the
markings of a group that could be studied in this paper, but their political action
committee was formed in 2001 and thus is too new to be included. 96 A second interest
group I could have studied is the National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce. This
organization is devoted to strengthening business relationships between the US and the
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Arab world. 97 While this group certainly has political concerns it is clearly directed
towards just business concerns, while AAI takes on a far more broad range of issues.
Walker's identification and discussion of citizen groups has allowed us to place
AAI into that grouping of interests. This is because AAI is an open-membership based
group that is not based on occupational or government interests. AAI is interested in
influencing policy that involves Arab-Americans. While they may take on numerous
issues ranging from civil rights and immigration to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle
East, they still care about those issues important to the Arab-American community and
work to advance the interests of that community.
Tierney's work is most useful to this paper when it is placed into context with the
typologies of groups that Walker earlier provided. While Walker provides us with the
definition of citizen groups, Tierney allows us to narrow down a more specific definition
of what type of interest group AAI represents because of his definition of what
constitutes ethnic interest groups. Using Walker's definition of citizen groups, we can
now place AAI as a citizen group and narrow it down even further by using Tierney's
definition of ethnic interest groups. Tierney's definition encompasses religious and
cultural sub-groupings and I'm focusing on the cultural aspects of his definition over his
inclusion of religion. 98 Therefore, we can refer to AAI as an ethnic citizen group by
combining Walker and Tierney's typologies. This is important in understanding how we
define AAI and in understanding its general goals, to promote the views of its members,
which happen to constitute an ethnic makeup.
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Using the work of Salisbury as a foundation of understanding we can consider
AAI to be an organization built upon the work of a political entrepreneur compared to a
patron because of its leader, Dr. James Zogby. We can determine that Dr. Zogby is a
political entrepreneur by examining his biography. This points out that he founded AAI
in 1985 and that he and AAI have worked to gain political empowerment for Arab
Americans in a variety of ways.99 One can continue to read his biography and will
quickly realize what a major political player that Dr. Zogby has become.
As early as the late 1970's, Dr. Zogby was making an impact when he co-founded
the Palestine Human Rights Campaign. In 1982, he co-founded Save Lebanon, Inc.,
which seeks to provide humanitarian aid in Lebanon. Dr. Zogby's political influence
began to become more apparent in 1993 when Vice-President Al Gore asked him to lead
an organization called Builders for Peace, whose goal was to promote American
businesses investing in the West Bank and Gaza. Not only has he worked with the
Clinton Administration, but also he was appointed in January of 2001 by President
George W. Bush to serve as a member of the Central-Asian-American Enterprise Fund. 100
Dr. Zogby's political resume is much more extensive than I have outlined here, but this
does serve to show that he is clearly a political entrepreneur. Based upon this information
and the work of Salisbury, we can accept that AAI represents an interest group formed on
the basis of political entrepreneurship compared to Walker's idea of patronage.
When examining the strategies that AAI chooses to employ we discover a great
deal about their effectiveness and the problems that they face. For example, AAI faces
strong conflict in their policy areas of concern. Further, they have no significant subunits
Arab American Institute, "Dr. James Zogby: Biography." Available from http://www.aaiusa.org;
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in which to organize an effective outside or grassroots campaign. 101 We can also assume
that AAI does not have the organizational resources of their competing interests groups,
which put them at a significant disadvantage to conduct an effective inside strategy. AAI
relies heavily on membership dues. Based on data that will be shown later, AAI takes an
inside strategy and uses an outside strategy to assist their inside efforts. This would be
similar to what Gais and Walker describe early on of interest groups who might use an
outside strategy to merely supplement their inside strategy. 102
One other item to keep in mind is the ethnic community as a voting bloc. Smith
has shown us the importance of the ethnic group vote as a key to influence. We can look
at the location of the Arab-American community in this regard to determine their voting
powers. While the Arab-American community may also exist in other states, their real
demographic concentration is their location in Michigan, which unlike the Jewish
community from New York doesn't automatically grant them a seat at the table for
foreign policy discussions. Yet, they do have large populations in the Congressional
districts in and around the Detroit metropolitan area, which does show the potential for
influence on a variety of issues.
Now with this understanding of how AAI fits into being an interest group and the
strategies it employs I can begin this case study with an examination of organizational
resources as shown in the model. Ari inside strategy was also discussed earlier and it is
understood to be applying direct communication with members of Congress through the
ioo Ibid.
I discovered in a telephone conversation with AAI on July 12, 2002 that they maintain no regional or
local chapters of their organization. They do maintain two operations offices outside of Washington, DC
though, one in Michigan and the other in New Jersey.
102
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Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000) 103.
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use of lobbyists. In this model any reference to organizational resources must be
understood in the broader context of what it really represents. Organizational resources
encompass a variety of things including staff size, which directly relates to staff activity.
A larger staff presents an interest group with the opportunity to accomplish more things
and make their message heard by more people in public policy, be it the Congress or
within the executive branch. Further, organizational resources can include the leadership
of an interest group. An interest group with a strong and charismatic leader can find
greater success at having their message heard that those organizations that lack such
leadership.
The means by which I have studied the effectiveness of AAI' s organizational
resources or its inside strategy is through a series of interviews I conducted in
Washington, DC in early March of 2002 with the foreign policy staffers to four different
members of Congress. 103 Pursuant to my agreement with these individuals, all of their
names and the names of the Representatives for whom they work are confidential. 104
Therefore I will employ a discreet means of identification to facilitate the study of this
paper. Representative A is from the Northeast. Representative Bis from the Southwest.
Representatives C and D are from the Great Lakes Region. Of the four members, two are
Republican and two are Democrats. Three of the four members also serve on the House
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I will readily admit that this is a very small number of offices in which to conduct interviews for
research purposes when there are 435 members of the U.S. House. I would simply remind individuals that
in the post-Sept. 11th and post-anthrax environment of Washington, D.C. I considered myself fortunate to
manage getting these four interviews. I contacted approximately forty different Congressional offices via
mail, email, fax, and finally by telephone attempting to gain an interview. I also used my personal
connections to gain a couple of the interviews I was able to get. I would like to thank all of those
individuals who granted me an interview.
104
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of my interview subjects.
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International Relations committee. Representative C is the only member who does not
serve on the House International Relations committee.
I also interviewed Mr. Majed Jafari, Director of Government Relations for AAI.
Two of the key goals of my interview with Mr. Jafari were to evaluate the political
strength of AAI and its effectiveness as perceived by the organization itself. In order to
achieve these goals I asked a variety of questions concerning the political growth of the
organization and its policy goals. The answers to many of those questions will give us
better insight into the political goals of AAI and how it seeks to achieve those goals.
Let me begin by discussing membership. According to Mr. Jafari, AAI has
approximately 12,000 individuals that make up its membership. This is a sizable
membership and could be used to make a political impact. Further, that membership has
increased since the Sept. 11 th attacks. Also that membership is based in key geographic
centers of the country. The largest concentration is in Dearborn, MI, but other areas
include Chicago, Cleveland, and the New York/New Jersey area. All of these are large
cities or regions and are politically important in election years. This could suggest a
potential political impact and a voting study could help to confirm this. Further, AAI has
become the de facto leader of Arab American interest groups with Dr. Zogby being an
ever more important political player who is increasingly sought out by members of
Congress for his advice and expertise.
During a discussion on AAI strategies and policy goals, I was able to learn a great
deal about how AAI tries to get its message out to policymakers. Two of these strategies
include getting prominent members of AAI to write op-ed's to significant newspapers
that could be seen by the policymaking community. Secondly and perhaps more
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important is their efforts to get more Congressional offices to meet with them. Following
the Sept. 11 th attacks, Mr. Jafari asserted that more policymakers are willing to take calls
from AAI even though their strategy had not changed significantly from before the
attacks. He viewed this increase in access as such, "What we have to say, is a bit more
important to people." Clearly he is suggesting that the attacks may have awakened
policymakers to the Arab American community and their unique expertise on issues of
importance to the Middle East. Further, we should remember that expertise is considered
vital to an inside strategy because many policymakers, especially members of Congress
and their staffers, cannot be experts on every issue and so they turn to interest groups for
that information.
Two other means of AAI asserting influence can be seen in different ways. The
first, according to Mr. Jafari, is getting individuals involved in the political process. This
means getting Arab Americans to vote, write their Congressperson or Senator, and
generally be politically active. This is clearly a means of an outside strategy that I am not
measuring, but wanted to point out. The other strategy is actually getting Arab Americans
elected to public office. This has both the feel of an outside strategy and an inside
strategy. It is an inside strategy because it automatically would provide AAI with allies in
public office which can be an important base for any successful inside strategies. While
both of these strategies are difficult to measure in terms of actually gaining influence, it is
important to know that they exist and are actively being implemented.
When we discussed specific policy goals of AAI, I differentiated between
domestic and foreign policy goals. I was surprised to learn that domestic policy is a
greater concern to AAI rather than foreign policy. I think many people would assume that
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the Middle East would be the organization's primary goal, but that is not so.
Nevertheless, foreign policy has been forced to become a primary goal, so says Mr.
Jafari, because of the conflict being experienced in the Middle East. Since they are the
leading Arab American interest group in the United States, they are forced to play a more
prominent role on this issue than perhaps they would like.
Yet, they do have a foreign policy agenda beyond just ending the violence in
Israel and the occupied territories. Two important foreign policy goals of AAI are
economic aid to both the occupied territories and Lebanon. They also are working
towards democratization in Jordan. They also oppose the current regime of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq, but to want provide for a moderating voice that wants diplomacy and not
military conflict as leading to regime change in Iraq.
The domestic agenda of AAI has two very important items that top their list of
policy goals. The first concern is airline profiling. Their argument is that profiling does
not work and only leads to an abuse of civil rights. Yet, if profiling is to take place they
want a role in the training and education of individuals who would be carrying out such
activities. Second, is immi gration policy. AAI argues that there are at least three separate
concerns related to immigration. The first is to reform the INS. Mr. Jafari referred to
them as " ...one of the most messed up agencies and maybe most neglected." Second, is
to urge caution in tracking down expired visas. Finally, is a concern over using databases
to keep track of immigrants because it could lead to violations of privacy.
The goals of AAI are quite simple. They want to increase their voice on Capitol
Hill. They want to accomplish this by becoming a more visible presence on the Hill itself,
but also by taking advantage of the media to make their message heard. By doing this
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they hope to accomplish the goals set forward in their foreign policy and domestic
agendas. Since they view themselves as the preeminent voice of the Arab American
community in Washington, D.C., they see it as their responsibility to make their message
heard to a wider audience and therefore setting themselves more in the center of the
public policy debate on several issues of importance to the Arab American community.
During my interviews with the Congressional staffers I found several common
themes and yet, some very different approaches to Congressional involvement in foreign
policy. Rep. A is a member of House International Relations committee and very active
in Congress with regard to foreign policy. The representative has met with several world
leaders and advocates for a U.S. foreign policy that is deeply involved in the Middle East,
while taking an unabashedly pro-Israel stance on numerous issues. Rep.Bis also on the
House International Relations committee. He takes a very strong stand on keeping the
U.S. out of the Middle East and would oppose the U.S. being involved in most
international activities unless it directly affects American national security. The
representative supports U.S. neutrality in the Middle East.
While Reps. A andBhave staked have very strong positions on U.S. foreign
policy, Rep. C has done the opposite. Representative C, who is not a member of the
House International Relations committee, tends to lean in favor of Israel, but prefers to
defer to the executive branch on matters of foreign policy. Rep. D, also a member of the
House International Relations committee, views the topic of the Middle East with a great
deal of neutrality. This is not to say he is an isolationist, but views both the Arab and
Jewish community has having legitimate arguments and is supportive a peace process in
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which all parties are involved. This effectively keeps the representative from taking a
position on either extreme of the issue.
One of the questions I asked each of the staffers concerned Arab American
groups' lobbying efforts. This question was not aimed at AAI specifically, but their name
was often discussed. I found the answers to be generally the same with minor differences.
All of the staffers agreed that the Arab American community was generally ineffective in
their lobbying efforts. The legislative assistant to Rep. D described their efforts as
"inferior" compared to Jewish interest groups and Rep. A's foreign policy assistant also
described Arab American efforts as being almost non-existent and unprofessional. During
my discussion concerning Arab American lobbying efforts I found that several of the
representatives receive more direct contact from Arab embassies than they do Arab
American interest groups.
The aides to Representative's B and C both stated that the majority of the contact
they receive from Arab American interest groups comes in the form of regular fax
transmissions. Both of these aides stated that they get very few telephone calls from Arab
American interest groups. The aide for Rep. C suggested that the best chance they might
get for a telephone call was only on issues of tremendous importance to Arab American
interest groups.
Compared to Arab American groups, all of the legislative aides agreed that Jewish
interest groups are significantly more effective at lobbying than their Arab counterparts.
The aide to Rep. C even stated that they had regular personal meetings with the staff of
Jewish interest groups as well as regular phone calls. The aide for Rep. D pointed out that
Jewish interest groups are always very visible and vocal. Further, they host regular events
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that are attended by the members of Congress and their staffers so that the Jewish interest
groups are consistently in front of the policy makers making their views prominently
heard. Also, the aide to Rep. D pointed out an important difference between the two
sides. He said that Jewish interest groups are very helpful in regularly responding to
requests for information and often volunteer it before even being asked, compared to
Arab American interest groups who do not regularly respond to or volunteer information
to the member's office.
I also asked if the lobbying efforts of the Arab American interest groups had
changed since the Sept. 11th attacks and the general answer was no. One of the aides
noticed what may be called a brief period of increased activity, but that had since fallen
off and another said there was only a "perception" of increased mail. The aide to Rep. D
did point out that their office was experiencing a significant increase in Arab embassy
activity since Sept. 11th. Further, I asked if the level of influence of the Arab American
community had changed in any way since Sept. 11th and the general answer was either no
it had not or that it was difficult to judge.
We can conclude from these interviews that AAI is not viewed as an effective
lobbying organization on Capitol Hill. Yet, we must recognize the very different
perceptions about AAI from the different staffers. For example, Rep. A already takes an
ardent pro-Israeli position and could be deemed by AAI as someone that they don't want
to lobby because it would be a waste of resources to them. On the other hand, they might
very well lobby Rep. B because he takes a much more neutral stand on the conflict in the
Middle East and could be considered approachable on some issues of concern to AAI.
Rep. C., while not on the House International Relations committee, could also be
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influenced because he comes from a state with a significant number of Arab Americans
living in it and so politically it could be in their best interest to at least listen to AAI.
Unfortunately, even though we can clearly see that the different representatives all have
different perceptions of AAI, we still find a common theme, which is that AAI is
ineffective at putting forth its message on Capitol Hill.
The next step for determining influence is to look at AAI's campaign
contributions to candidates running for public office. Formally, AAI is not the name
listed as the PAC. The PAC used for this study is the Arab American Leadership Council
Political Action Committee (ALCPAC). ALCPAC is closely linked to AAI in several
ways. First, Dr. Zogby is a member of ALCPAC governing board. ALCPAC also shares
office space and even office staff with AAI, according to Federal Elections Commission
(FEC) reports. Finally, ALCPAC is directly linked to the AAI website for requesting
donations. Based on this information we can assume that a reference to ALCPAC is
equivalent to AAI and that they also share the same policy positions.
A well-known general assumption of politics is that money buys influence or at
least access to policy makers. Many political scientists disagree with this point of view,
though, including John Wright. He effectively dismantles this assumption in a study
linking contributions from pro-tobacco PAC's and two Senate roll call votes on stricter
tobacco policy. By doing this, Wright argues that we cannot create strong linkages
between campaign contributions and how a member of Congress will vote on policy. 105
Even if money does not determine votes a variety of other factors could. This could
include what the constituency wants, the legislator's staff could convince him using
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expert opinions, and keeping the party line could all influence how an individual
legislator casts their vote.
Even with critics like Wright, it is still possible to use PAC contributions as a
measure of influence. By no means am I suggesting that a PAC contribution
automatically guarantees an interest group support on every issue a member of Congress
will face that pertains to them. Instead, the contribution might at least give an interest
group the opportunity to meet with a member of Congress or their staff and allow them
the chance to make a case for their position on the policies that they are concerned with.
The manner in which the influence of PAC contributions is measured is by
examining two key roll call votes in the House in the lOih Congress. Using FEC data
from the 1999-2000 and the current 2001-2002 election cycles, I discovered forty-four
members of the House who received contributions from ALCPAC and still served in the
lOih Congress. 106 Of the forty-four members, 34 are Democrats, 9 are Republicans, and
one Independent. AAI strategy for giving contributions is relatively simple. According to
Mr. Jafari, contributions are given to any Arab American running for office regardless of
political party and they are also given to those members who are considered friends of the
Arab American community.
The two roll call votes chosen were the only two roll call votes listed by AAI in
their 2002 Congressional Scorecard, which is why they were selected for my model. 107
Their scorecard is an evaluation of how each member of Congress feels on a variety of
105
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issues of deemed by AAI to be of importance to the Arab American community. They are
listed in this study in chronological order and not in order of importance to AAI. The first
roll call vote is the USA PATRIOT Act (see appendix B, table 1), which was passed on
Oct. 241\ 2001. 108 According to AAI's scorecard, this legislation grants the government
many new powers to investigate and detain individuals, which could lead to serious civil
rights violations. A second complaint is that this bill grants "the U.S. Secretary of State
the power to desi gnate any forei gn or domestic group as a terrorist organization" without
it being subject to review. 109 The second roll call vote is actually House Resolution 392
(see appendix B, table 2), which is meant to show support for Israel in its fight against
terrorism, passed on May 2nd, 2002. AAI opposed this resolution because it failed to
mention the ever-worsening Palestinian humanitarian crisis.110 In examining these two
roll call votes, I separated out the vote tallies and also separated between those members
of Congress who received campaign contributions from ALCPAC and those who did not.
The results from the two roll call votes and the PAC contribution connection
provides for some interesting results. In appendix B, table 1, the PATRIOT ACT vote, we
find that a little over half of those who received a campaign contribution voted in a
manner favorable to AAI's position, while anyone who did not receive a campaign
contribution was far less likely to vote against the bill. A member of Congress was far
more likely to vote in favor of this legislation if they did not receive a contribution from
ALCPAC. Several reasons could exist for why the 45% of those who received a
contribution but still voted in favor of the legislation. These reasons could include toeing
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the party line and that it would be politically unreasonable for them to oppose it because
of their constituency.
Concerning the party breakdown on the roll call votes, Republicans who received
campaign contributions from ALCPAC were far more likely to vote against AAI's
position than Democrats. Republicans only voted with AAI three times between the two
roll calls. On the PATRIOT ACT, Democrats who received campaign contributions from
ALCP AC voted 21 to 12 in favor of AAI's position.111 One could argue that the party
line is what caused people to vote either for or against AAI's position and not the PAC
contribution. That is a legitimate point, but an individual could also be getting rewarded
with a PAC contribution for voting with AAI. Furthermore, if one looks at the AAI 2002
Congressional Scorecard, they learn that even those members who voted against them on
these roll call votes often did other things that earned them AAI's support, such as
sponsor other legislation or sign a letter that supported a position of AAI's.
The results of the "Solidarity with Israel" resolution (see appendix B, table 2) also
find that a member was far more likely to vote in a manner favorable to AAI's position if
they had received a campaign contribution from ALCPAC then if they had not. AAI was
able to muster thirteen "No" votes from members it had given contributions to, while
only eight who had not received a contribution directly voted against the bill. Yet, AAI
also viewed a vote of "Present" as favorable to their policy position and was able to get
20% of those it had given money to too vote in this manner. A surprising twenty
members (or 5%) of those who did not receive ALCPAC money also voted "Present."
This high number is surprising because those who did not receive money were much
more likely to vote in favor of this resolution rather than against it and such a significant
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number of "Present" votes could be viewed as a very minor victory for AAI because it
got a small number of members of Congress to not endorse the way Israel is fighting its
war on terrorism. Again, some of the same reasons mentioned earlier could exist for those
members who received campaign support yet voted against AAI's position.
The results of this examination of roll call votes and PAC contributions show us
that AAI does have some influence with members of Congress, especially those it
provides campaign contributions to. We should not be surprised that not every member
who received a contribution from ALCPAC voted for AAI's positions. Any number of
reasons might explain their vote. Further, we should not also blindly accept the idea that a
campaign contribution was the sole reason why a member of Congress votes in a manner
favorable to AAI' s position. Any number of factors could exist other than a campaign
contribution that would explain their vote. Nevertheless, we should be accepting that this
information does present us with the fact that AAI has some influence with some
members of Congress. It does not mean that they carry overwhelming influence, because
campaign contributions to only forty-four members of Congress is not a huge number
when put in the perspective that the House has 435 members in it.
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CONCLUSION

Using the earlier literature on interest groups we are able to gain insight into what
these types of groups hope to accomplish and how. Walker and Tierney provide us with
the necessary definitions to help us understand that AAI is an ethnic citizen group that
represents the Arab American community on Capitol Hill. This definition is important to
us because many other types of interest groups exist that it could create confusion without
a proper definition. Furthermore, from the other information gleaned in the literature
review we have learned what motivates an interest group and what their political
strategies might entail.
With this information in hand, we discover that AAI is an organization motivated
to represent the interests of Arab Americans on issues of political importance to them,
both foreign and domestic. Further, AAI being the de facto leader of Arab American
interest groups, it is forced to take on issues it would prefer to avoid because their
membership and events out of their control dictate that they work on issues they would
rather not deal with.
When their influence is measured using the interviews and PAC contributions, we
discover mixed results. The interviews with Congressional staffers suggest that AAI is a
very ineffective interest group at delivering its message compared to other interest
groups. Yet, the perceptions of the Congressional staffers are very different from each
other. One was an ardently pro-Israel member, one was practicality an isolationist, and
the other two shared more moderate views, actually encouraging the concept that AAI
should be more active. Yet, even with these different perspectives we discover a common
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feeling, that AAI does not have that much influence on Capitol Hill because they don't
get their message across.
Nonetheless, when their PAC contributions are examined, we find that those
members of Congress who receive contributions are far more likely to side with AAI on
issues of importance to them. This would suggest that AAI could gain further influence if
they could raise the funds to compete financially with interest groups like AIPAC.
Therefore, influence is possible if they could gather the financial resources. Increased
monetary resources does not automatically mean they just have the money to compete
with campaign contributions, but could also hire increased staff, which increases their
ability to conduct an inside strategy. This strategy would mean more personal contacts
with members of Congress to get their views better known on Capitol Hill.
AAI is an organization that faces an uphill battle in some respects. First, they are
forced to take on issues that they don't want to constantly face, such as the Middle East.
When they must constantly keep redirecting precious resources to other issues they lose
ground on those issues of greater importance to the organization. Resources can be
stretched only so far. Secondly, they face off against groups on the Israeli side who are
better financed and have larger staffs. Finally, they must get their message to Capitol Hill
in far more effective ways than mailings and faxes. Their lobbyists must become well
known fixtures of the Capitol Hill corridors if they are to become an organization with
the political clout that is needed to be as effective as groups like AIPAC.
Something that has not been covered in this paper is a discussion of assimilation
by Arab Americans into mainstream America. By assimilation, I mean the Arab
American community joining into mainstream American political culture. This extends to
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voting, the organization of interest groups, and creating a unifying political community. I
would argue that this is also an issue that faces all ethnic interest groups before they can
become a potent political force. The concept of assimilation, as I see it, is when an ethnic
community becomes part of mainstream American politics and leaves their cultural
political roots behind them. An example could include allowing women the right to vote
if in their home country that would not have been possible.
The Arab American community is making significant inroads into assimilating
into mainstream American political life. There are statistics available pointing out that the
Arab American community does vote and actually does not overly lean to one political
party or another.112 What needs to happen is a mobilization on the part of the entire ethnic
community to become actively involved in the political process. This does not mean that
they must pick one party or another, but simply take the needed steps to make their
voices heard at the ballot box. One last point to keep in mind is that it is possible for an
ethnic community to become so assimilated that they lose their ethnic identity as a
political force. Eventually all ethnic groups must walk that gray line between being
assimilated enough to have influence and being so assimilated that they lose it.
To some extent, AAI's future prospects for increased influence depend on the
external world that is out of their control. These events could include such possibilities as
a change of U.S. policy in the Middle East or an end to the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. Even a major internal breakdown in the strength of Jewish interest groups,
such as AIPAC, would be the kind of event that would help to increase the relative
influence of AAI. Nonetheless, external events are not the only means of change for AAI.
112
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As I stated earlier, a stronger lobbying presence on Capitol Hill will significantly improve
AAI's level of influence and credibility. While AAI's immediate future may not be the
brightest their future is not dim either. To some extent their future is in their own hands
and the hands of their ethnic community who must continue to develop their political
prowess to be politically influential.
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Appendix A
My Research Model
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Figure 1: Research Model
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Appendix B
VOTING AND PAC TABLES

59

Table 1
USA PATRIOT Act
ALCPAC Contributions
Received Contribution
No Contribution
337
45%
Yes 20
87%
43
11%
52%
No 23
1
2%
No Vote
8
2%
388
Total 44

Total
357
66
9
432

Notes: AAI views a "Yes" vote as unfavorable and a "No" vote as favorable to their
policy position. Based on the 432 votes tallied we can assume that there were three
open seats in the House. The bill passed the House of Representatives on 10/24/01.
Sources: Arab American Institute, Federal Elections Commission, and the U.S.
House of Representatives.

Table 2
"Solidarity With Israel" House Resolution 392

<
0
00

9
9

ALCPAC Contributions
Received Contribution
No Contribution
333
43%
86%
Yes 19
30%
No 13
8
2%
9
20
20%
5%
Present
3
29
7%
No Vote
7%
390
Total 44

Total
352
21
29
32
434

Notes: AAI views a "Yes" vote as unfavorable and a "No" or "Present" vote as
favorable to their policy position. Based on the 434 votes tallied we can assume that
there was one open seat in the House. The resolution passed the House of
Representatives on 05/02/02.
Sources: Arab American Institute, Federal Elections Commission, and the U.S.
House of Representatives.
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Appendix C
ALCPAC CONTRIBUTION LIST
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Alabama
Earl F. Hilliard (D)
California
Barbara Lee (D)
Fortney Pete Stark (D)
Zoe Lofgren (D)
Adam H. Schiff (D)
Maxine Waters (D)
Dana Rohrabacher (R)
Darrell Issa (R)
Georgia
Cynthia A. McKinney (D)
Illinois
Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. (D)
Danny K. Davis (D)
Ray LaHood (R)
Louisiana
Christopher John (D)
Maine
John Elias Baldacci (D)
Michigan
Dave Camp (R)
Dale E. Kildee (D)
David E. Bonior (D)
Joe Knollenberg (R)
Lynn N. Rivers (D)
John Conyers, Jr. (D)
Carolyn C. Kilpatrick (D)
John D. Dingell (D)
Mississippi
Bennie G. Thompson (D)
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New Hampshire
John E. Sununu (R)
New Jersey
Donald M. Payne (D)
New York
Gregory W. Meeks (D)
Jose E. Serrano (D)
Sherwood L. Boehlert (R)
Maurice D. Hinchey (D)
North Carolina
Eva M. Clayton (D)
Melvin L. Watt (D)

Tony P. Hall (D)
Marcy Kaptur (D)
Dennis J. Kucinich (D)
Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D)
James A. Traficant, Jr. (D)
Tennessee
Harold E. Ford, Jr. (D)
Texas
Ron Paul (R)
Shelia Jackson Lee (D)
Vermont
Bernie Sanders (I)
Virginia
James P. Moran (D)
Rick Boucher (D)
Thomas M. Davis (R)
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West Virginia
Nick J. Rahall, II (D)
Totals
Republican: 9
Democratic: 34
Independent: 1
Total: 44
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HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
LETTER OF APPROVAL
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Date: January 28, 2002
To:

John Clark, Principal Investigator
Robert Harbaugh, Student Investigator for thesis

From: Mary Lagerwey, Chair
Re:

HSIRB Project Number 02-01-14

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "The Impact of
the Arab-American Lobby on Congressional Decision-Making" has been approved
under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review
Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of
Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as
described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In
addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events
associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project
and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:

January 28, 2003

66
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arab American Institute, "2002 Congressional Scorecard." Available from
http://www.aaiusa.org; (Accessed August 1, 2002.) Internet.
Arab American Institute, "Demographics." Available from http://www.aaiusa.org;
(Accessed September 3, 2002.) Internet.
Arab American Institute, "Dr. James Zogby: Biography." Available from
http://www.aaiusa.org; (Accessed July 19, 2002.) Internet.
Arab American Institute, "Facts on Arab American Voters." Available from
http://www.aaiusa.org; (Accessed November 14, 2002.) Internet.
Arab American Institute, "Mission." Available from http://www.aaiusa.org; (Accessed
July 19, 2002.) Internet.
Berry, Jeffrey M. The Interest Group Society, 3d ed. (New York: Longman, 1997).
Clark, Peter B. and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations,"
Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (Sept., 1961): 129-166.
Erickson, Robert S. "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting," American
Political Science Review, (Dec., 1971): 1018-1032.
Federal Elections Commission, "Campaign Finance Reports." Available from
http://www.fec.gov; (Accessed August 1, 2002.) Internet.
Federal Elections Commission, "Prohibited Contributions." Available from
http://www.fec.gov; (Accessed Sept. 6, 2002.) Internet.
Gais, Thomas L. and Jack L. Walker, Jr. "Pathways to Influence in American Politics," in
Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements, ed.
Jack L. Walker, Jr., 103-122. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).
Jones, Philip. "The Appeal of the Political Entrepreneur," British Journal of Political
Science, (Oct., 1978): 498-504.
Lindsay, James. "Getting Uncle Sam's Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America's
Foreign Style." Brookings Review 20, no. 1 (2002): 37-40. Available from
http://www.brook.edu; (Accessed April 8, 2002.) Internet.
Madison, James. The Federalist Papers. ed. Clinton Rossiter. (New York: Mentor, 1961).

67
National Association of Arab Americans-Arab American Anti-Discrimination
Committee, "About NAAA-ADC." Available from http://www.naaa-adc.org; (Accessed
October 23, 2002.) Internet.
National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, "Mission." Available from
http://www.nusacc.org; (Accessed October 15, 2002.) Internet.
Salisbury, Robert H. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," Midwest Journal of
Political Science 13 (Feb., 1969) 1-32.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman and John Tierney. "More of the Same: Washington Pressure
Group Activity in a Decade of Change," The Journal of Politics (May, 1983): 351-377.
Smith, Tony. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of
American Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2000).
Tierney, John "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense
Policy," in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, ed. Randall
B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, 89-111. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1993).
Tucker, Cynthia, "Jews and Arabs Wage Proxy War in Federal Elections," Kalamazoo
Gazette, 5 July 2002, sec. A, p. 6.
Walker, Jack L., Jr. "Explaining the Mobilization of Interests," in Mobilizing Interest
Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements, ed. Jack L. Walker, Jr.,
41-56. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).
Walker, Jack L., Jr. "The Mobilization of Political Interests in America," in Mobilizing
Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements, ed. Jack L.
Walker, Jr., 19-40. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000).
Wright, John R. "Tobacco Industry PACs and the Nation's Health: A Second Opinion,"
in The Interest Group Connection, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, et. al., 174-195. (Chatham:
Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1997).

